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"JURISDICTION" IN FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: CONFUSION,
CONTRADICTION, AND SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
LAURIE REYNOLDS*

I. INTRODUCTION
The recent and rapid emergence of tribal judicial systems as formal institutions
for resolving disputes involving Native Americans or occurring on Indian
reservations has received seemingly unqualified praise and support from all
branches of the federal government. Legislation such as the Indian Tribal Justice
Act,' though woefully underfunded,2 emphasizes congressional intent to support
and encourage the growth of tribal court systems.3 Federal administrative
officials lavish effusive praise on tribal courts.4 Similarly, the United States
Supreme Court has articulated its strong endorsement of tribal forums. For
example, in its holding that the federal Indian Civil Rights Act 5 did not create
a federal cause of action, the Court stressed that "[t]ribal courts have repeatedly
been recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes
affecting important personal and property interests of both Indians and nonIndians." 6
Subsequently, the Court's pronouncement of the doctrine of
exhaustion of tribal remedies in National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow
Tribe of Indians7 and Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante' emphasized that
"[tiribal courts play a vital role in tribal self-government and the Federal
Government has consistently encouraged their development." 9
While tribal courts have received the Supreme Court's apparently unequivocal
endorsement, other tribal powers have not fared so well. In a series of cases
beginning with Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe0 and Montana v. United States,"
the Supreme Court has narrowed a tribe's ability to regulate the activities of nonIndians on reservation lands. For instance, the Court recently announced nearly
unanimous support for seemingly blanket restrictions that would prohibit tribal
regulation of non-Indian land 12 or non-Indians 3 within a reservation. This

Professor, University of Illinois College of Law.
1. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994).
2. Actually, the term "unfunded" would be more accurate. According to one article, as of December, 1995,
"[tiribal courts ha[d] yet to receive a single benefit under the Indian Tribal Justice Act." Joseph A. Myers &
Elbridge Coochise, Development of Tribal Courts: Past, Present, and Future, 79 JUDICATURE 147, 148 (1995).
Myers and Coochise chronicle the failed congressional promises of $58.4 million per year; at the time of their
article's publication, no money had been appropriated for tribal courts. See id.
3. The Indian Tribal Justice Act, recites numerous congressional findings that emphasize the "selfdetermination, self-reliance, and inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes." 25 U.S.C. § 3601(3) (1994).
4. See, e.g., Janet Reno, A Federal Commitment to Tribal Justice Systems, 79 JUDICATURE 113 (1995).
5. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1994).
6. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978).
7. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
8. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
9. Id.at 14-15 (citation omitted).
10. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
11. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
12. In South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993), the Court categorically stated: "[W]hen Congress
has broadly opened up [reservation] land to non-Indians, the effect of the transfer is the destruction of preexisting Indian rights to regulatory control." Id. at 692; see infra note 21.
13. With respect to tribal power over nonmembers, the Bourland Court was equally categorical, stressing
*
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frontal assault on tribal sovereignty appears inconsistent with National Farmers'
ringing praise and promise of protection of tribal self-determination. And for
lower courts trying to decipher the implications of these pronouncements on tribal
jurisdiction, the Court's conflicting signals have created confusion and
uncertainty. Most recently, the Eighth 14 and Ninth 5 Circuits have resolved this
conflict by concluding that, notwithstanding the Court's broad endorsement of
tribal judicial power, all assertions of tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction must meet
the Court's more restrictive definition of tribal legislative jurisdiction over nonIndians and non-Indian land. As a result, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have
refused to recognize the legitimacy of tribal court adjudications of on-reservation
disputes involving non-Indians.
This Article describes the evolution and current status of the two inconsistent
lines of Supreme Court cases in disputes involving tribal jurisdiction. It illustrates
how the restrictive approach recently adopted by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits,
although facially consistent with Supreme Court precedent, has unnecessarily
limited tribal adjudicatory powers. By equating the scope of a tribe's
adjudicatory jurisdiction with the scope of a tribe's legislative jurisdiction as
defined in Montana and its progeny, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have refused
to allow tribal courts to adjudicate many cases that otherwise would fall
comfortably within the range of tribal subject matter jurisdiction. The Article
then argues that, although the Court has steadfastly continued to restrict tribal
legislativejurisdiction over non-Indians, the Court should explicitly recognize that
it is equally staunch in its support of an expansive definition of tribal
adjudicatoryjurisdiction.
Outside the field of Indian law, the distinction between adjudicatory and
legislative jurisdiction appears to be well established: legislative jurisdiction
refers to "the power of a state to apply its law to create or affect legal
interests."' 6 Adjudicatory or judicial jurisdiction, in contrast, is defined as "the
power of a state to try a particular action in its courts."' 7 The two separate

"the general rule that an Indian tribe's inherent sovereign powers do not extend to non-Indian activity."
Bourland, 508 U.S. at 687.
14. See A-I Contractors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930 (8th Cit. 1996), aff'd, Strate v. A-i Contractors, 117 S. Ct.

1404 (1997); see also discussion infra notes 58-88, 93-95, and accompanying text. A-) Contractorswas decided
by the United States Supreme Court at press time, and thus the Court's decision could not be integrated into this
Article. The Court did not adopt the approach advocated in this Article. See generally A-] Contractors, 117 S.

Ct. 1404.
15. See Yellowstone County v. Pease, 96 F.3d 1169 (9th Cit. 1996); see also discussion infra notes 89-92
and accompanying text.
16. Willis L. M. Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction,78 COLUM. L. REv. 1587, 1591 (1978).
17. McCluney v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 649 F.2d 578, 581 n.3 (8th Cir. 1981) (emphasis omitted); see
also Tallentire v. Offshore Logistics, Inc., 754 F.2d 1274, 1284 n.18 (5th Cit. 1985) (distinguishing legislative
jurisdiction from judicial jurisdiction); In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 580 F. Supp. 690, 707
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICTS § 377 cmt. a (1934), which notes that "each state
has legislative jurisdiction[, i.e., power] to determine the legal effect of facts done or events caused within its
territory"). Justice Scalia has stressed that legislative jurisdiction refers to "'the authority of a state to make its
law applicable to persons or activities,' and is quite a separate matter from 'jurisdiction to adjudicate[.]'
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) (quoting I
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 231, 235 (1987)).

Although the term "adjudicatory jurisdiction" is more common, some writers use "judicial jurisdiction," see,
e.g., FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS 82 (1995), or "adjudicative jurisdiction," see, e.g., Joseph
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domains, although similar in their evaluation of sovereign relationships with
parties to a lawsuit and with the underlying subject matter of litigation, are not
coterminous.
Incorporating this distinction into the field of Indian law would bring much
needed precision to the analysis of tribal jurisdiction. Moreover, the distinction
would be a recognition of the important tribal interests in providing a fair and
efficient means of resolving disputes that arise within the borders of a reservation
or that involve the people who live and work there. Failure to make the
distinction between legislative jurisdiction and adjudicatory jurisdiction, in
contrast, will continue the current trend to subsume the analysis of tribal
adjudicatory jurisdiction within the larger, more problematic debate over a tribe's
ability to exercise legislative jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians on a
reservation. As a result, tribes will be denied the ability to adjudicate "ordinary,
run-of-the-mill"'" cases in which the sovereign interest in adjudication would,
in the non-tribal context, be self-evident.19 This Article argues that tribal courts
must be free to develop an adjudicatory system that is unhampered by external
constraints that are neither mandated by the Supreme Court's own holdings nor
compelled by federal Indian policy.
II. CONFLICTING PRESUMPTIONS OF TRIBAL JURISDICTION
A. Limits on Tribal Legislative Jurisdiction
In its decision in Montana v. United States, 20 the United States Supreme Court
narrowly construed tribal legislative powers and invalidated the Crow Tribe's
attempt to regulate the hunting and fishing activities of non-Indians on land that,
notwithstanding its location on the Crow Reservation, was owned in fee simple
by nonmembers of the tribe. 2' Although Montana was the modem Court's first

William Singer, Publicity Rights and the Conflict of Laws: Tribal CourtJurisdictionin the Crazy Horse Case,
41 S.D. L. REv. 1, 27 (1996). Adjudicatory jurisdiction is comprised of several component parts: the court
must have personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy. See 1
ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS § 1.01, at 1-2 to 1-9 (2d ed. 1991).
18. A-) Contractors,76 F.3d at 940 (holding that the tribal court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a personal
injury lawsuit arising within the exterior borders of the reservation).
19. As one dissenting opinion has noted, with a tinge of frustration, a tribe's desire to exercise its judicial
powers to resolve disputes that arise within the reservation's borders is not in any way extraordinary. See id. at
944 (Gibson, J., dissenting). To deny a tribe "the ability to adjudicate the type of basic disputes that occur daily
within Indian territory ... interferes with the tribe's ability to manage its affairs .... "lId
20. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
21. The presence of land held in fee simple by non-Indians within the exterior borders of an Indian
reservation is due to the General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 381 (1994)) (also known at the Dawes Act), and the Special
Allottments Acts, see, e.g., Curtis Act, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495-519 (1898) (allotting tribal lands of "the Five
Civilized Tribes"), applicable only to various individual tribes. Pursuant to these laws, tribal land was
transferred to individual tribal members, who were then able to sell the land to any willing buyer. See General
Allotment Act, 25 U.S.C. § 349. The allotment policy expressed congressional intent "to extinguish tribal
sovereignty, erase reservation boundaries, and force the assimilation of Indians into the society at large." County
of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 254 (1992). Although the
General Allotment Act was repudiated with the 1934 passage of the Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, § 1,
48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-483 (1994)), which reconstituted tribal ownership of
reservation lands and prohibited further transfers to individual Indians or to non-Indian buyers, many reservations
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evaluation of tribal authority to exercise civil regulatory control over nonmembers,
that opinion in turn relied on the doctrine of implicit divestiture articulated seven
years earlier in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe.22 The Oliphant Court,
invalidating a tribe's exercise of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, established
the general rule that Indian tribes "cannot exercise power inconsistent with their
diminished status as sovereigns' ' 23 and thus had set the stage for nonmember
allegations of implicit divestiture of various facets of tribal powers.
The Court's decision in Montana, then, first established that Oliphant's theory
of implicit divestiture is equally applicable to disputes over a tribe's civil
regulatory powers. At the outset, the Montana Court noted that the "exercise of
tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to
control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of tribes and so
2 4 It then announced
cannot survive without express congressional delegation.
the "general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do
not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe."' This apparently broad
restriction of tribal regulatory power was softened somewhat by the Court's
articulation of two specific exceptions (known as "the Montana exceptions") to
the general divestment of tribal power over non-Indians. First, the Court stated
that tribes retain inherent sovereign power to regulate "the activities of

were left with large portions of the land held in fee simple by non-Indian or nonmember owners. See generally
Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARtZ ST. L.J. 1 (1995).
All land located within the exterior borders of the reservation, irrespective of ownership, meets the federal
statutory definition of Indian country. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151 (a)-(c) (1994). Indian country consists of:
(a) [All land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United
States Government, not withstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way
running through the reservation; (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of
the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and
whether within or without the limits of a state; and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles
to which have not been extinguished, including ights-of-way running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994).
Although the Indian country definition applies specifically to federal criminal statutes, the Supreme Court once
indicated that the definition generally applies to questions of civil jurisdiction, as well. See DeCoteau v. District
County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975). Subsequent case law, however, has squarely rejected that
suggestion; the Court's analysis of tribal legislative jurisdiction has devastated tribal power to regulate activities
on fee land within the reservation, even though that land clearly constitutes Indian country under 18 U.S.C.
section 1151 (1994). See, e.g., Montana, 450 U.S. 544. In fact, the Tenth Circuit has noted that several lower
federal courts have openly questioned the continuing viability of DeCoteau's dictum. See Pittsburg & Midway
Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531, 1540 n.10 (10th Cir. 1995). The battle over the relevance of a
land's status as Indian country is raging in the area of state taxation. See infra note 35.
22. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). Application of the doctrine of implicit divestiture allows courts to invalidate the
exercise of tribal powers that are inconsistent with the tribe's dependent status. See id. at 208-10. Resolution of
that issue depends in large part on whether the disputed tribal power would be "inconsistent with the overriding
interests of the National Government." Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134, 153 (1980). The doctrine has been used to deny tribal power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians, Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195, and over nonmember Indians, Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990),
superceded by 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1994); to regulate the hunting and fishing activities of non-Indians who own
land in fee within the borders of the reservation. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566-67 (1981); and to zone the property
of some nonmembers living within the borders of a reservation, Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of
the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 428-30 (1989).
23. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565 (citing Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209).
24. Id at 564.
25. Id at 565.
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nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members. 26
Second, the Court recognized that "[a] tribe may also retain inherent power to
exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its
reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. 27
In subsequent cases, however, the Court has displayed an unwillingness to uphold
tribal regulation of non-Indian activities and has suggested that the exception for
important tribal interests is even more narrow than the Montana Court's language
would indicate. In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian
Nation,28 for example, Justice White's plurality opinion denied a tribe the ability
to zone fee land on its reservation, construing the two Montana exceptions as
authorizing tribal zoning only if "the uses that were actually authorized [by county
zoning ordinances] on [the non-Indian land] imperiled the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the Tribe." 29 For the Brendale
plurality, then, Montana's allowance of tribal regulation of non-Indian activities
with a "direct effect" on tribal sovereign interests has been replaced by the more
stringent requirement that a tribe can regulate only non-Indian activity that has a
"demonstrably serious" impact that "imperil[s]" tribal sovereignty.30
The Supreme Court's 1993 opinion in South Dakota v. Bourland reiterated the
Court's willingness to prohibit most tribal regulation of non-Indian activities. 3'
Rejecting the tribe's attempt to regulate hunting and fishing activities over
nonmembers within the borders of the reservation, on land taken by the federal
government pursuant to a dam and reservoir project, the Bourland Court restated
the view that "after Montana, tribal sovereignty over nonmembers 'cannot survive
without express congressional delegation' ....,32 Although this restrictive view
of tribal sovereign power has received widespread criticism in the legal litera-

26. Id In South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993), the Court described the first Montanaexception
more fully: "[A] tribe may license or otherwise regulate activities of nonmembers who enter 'consensual
relationships' with the tribe or its members through contracts, leases, or other commercial dealings." Id. at 695
(quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565). For examples of cases in which courts concluded that the tribe retained
sovereignty to regulate non-Indian activities pursuant to this exception, see United States ex rel. Morongo Band
v. Rose, 34 F.3d 901, 906 (9th Cir. 1994) (upholding application of bingo ordinance to a non-Indian enterprise
on the reservation) and FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311, 1314 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying tribal
employment ordinance to non-Indian conducting business on the reservation).
27. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
28. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
29. Id.at 431.
30. Id Courts have struggled to decipher whether the Supreme Court's "seriously imperil" language in
Brendale is intended to make the Montana exception more stringent. See, e.g., Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. South
Dakota, 917 F. Supp. 1434, 1446 n.17 (D.S.D. 1996) (wondering whether Brendale's language should be seen
as an alteration to the Montana exception). At least one lower federal court has concluded that Brendale's
"demonstrably serious" language modifies and is consistent with the Montana standard. See Montana v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 941 F. Supp. 945, 957 (D. Mont. 1996).
31. See Bourland, 508 U.S. at 695 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 565). Bourland discussed "the general
proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers
of the tribe." Id.(quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565). In a 1992 opinion, the Court also stressed "the very
narrow powers reserved to tribes over the conduct of non-Indians within their reservations." County of Yalkima
v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 267 (1992).
32. Bourland, 508 U.S. at 695 n.15 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 564).
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ture,33 the lower federal courts have faithfully applied the Supreme Court's rule
to invalidate many tribal attempts to regulate non-Indian behavior' on land
5
within the exterior borders of the reservation owned in fee by non-Indians.
33. -See, e.g., Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Basedand Membership-Based Views of Indian Tribal
Sovereignty: The Supreme Court'sChanging Vision, 55 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1 (1993); L. Scott Gould, The Consent
Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96 COLuM. L. REV. 809 (1996); Joseph William Singer,
Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1991).
34. See, e.g., Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Aspaas, 77 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 1996) (invalidating the application
of a tribal employment ordinance to a non-Indian utility operating on the reservation); Bourland, 39 F.3d 868
(holding that non-Indian hunting and fishing activities on fee lands on the reservation do not have a direct effect
on the tribe's sovereignty and thus the tribal attempt to regulate that behavior is invalid); Lower Brule Sioux
Tribe, 917 F. Supp. 1434 (holding that the tribe had no sovereign power to regulate hunting and fishing on fee
lands or on lands taken by the federal government pursuant to enabling legislation); Devils Lake Sioux Indian
Tribe v. North Dakota Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 896 F. Supp. 955 (D.N.D. 1995) (ruling that tribes cannot regulate
electrical services on the reservation); Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Southern Mo. Waste Management Dist., 890 F.
Supp. 878 (D.S.D. 1995) (holding that the tribe could not regulate a municipal solid waste landfill to be built
on non-Indian land within borders of the reservation); Cassidy v. United States, 875 F. Supp. 1438 (E.D. Wash.
1994) (ruling that the tribe was powerless to regulate fishing by non-Indians on lake located within exterior
borders of reservation). But see United States ex rel. Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 34 F.3d 901
(9th Cir. 1994) (upholding the applicability of tribal ordinance to non-Indians, concluding that Montana's
exceptions had been satisfied); Montana, 941 F. Supp. 945 (upholding the Environmental Protection Agency's
conclusion that the tribe met the standard for receiving "treatment as state" (TAS) status under the Clean Water
Act, applying Montana's exceptions, as modified by the "demonstrably serious" language of Brendale).
35. As one federal court has recently described, several distinct varieties of ownership typically exist within
the borders of Indian reservations: "tribal lands held in trust by the United States for the benefit of the Tribe,
lands held by the Tribe in its own name, individual Indian allotments subject to federal trust restrictions, land
owned in fee simple by individual Indians, and lands held in fee simple by non-Indian third parties." Southern
Ute Indian Tribe v. Board of County Comm'rs, 855 F. Supp. 1194, 1196 (D. Colo. 1994), judgment vacated,
appealdismissed by 61 F.3d 916 (10th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court's holdings of implicit divestiture of tribal
sovereignty, however, have been limited to the last category of land ownership, that is, land owned in fee by
non-Indians. Because the Court appears to equate transfer of land ownership to non-Indians with loss of tribal
legislative power, Bourland, 508 U.S. at 688-89, the other patterns of ownership noted above should not effect
a divestment of tribal sovereign power.
It is true, however, that recent cases suggest that ownership patterns may affect non-Indian governments'
ability to exercise certain powers over land held by individual Indians or tribes. For purposes of state income
or sales taxation, the residence of the individual Indian is crucial; several recent cases suggest that the income
of Indians living on land that meets the federal definition of Indian country, 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994), is immune
from state tax, while those living on other lands do not receive the same immunity. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n
v. Chickasaw Nation, 115 S. Ct. 2214 (1995); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114
(1993); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991). For a critical
analysis of those decisions, see Gloria Valencia-Weber, Shrinking Indian Country: A State Offensive to Divest
Tribal Sovereignty, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1281 (1995). For a description of the federal Indian country statute, see
supra note 21.
As for property taxation, the Supreme Court has indicated that alienability is a key factor in determining the
permissibility of state taxation of land located within the borders of a reservation. In County of Yakima v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, the Court held that land transferred out of tribal
ownership pursuant to the General Allotment Act was subject to non-tribal property taxes, even though the land
was owned in fee simple by an individual Indian. See 502 U.S. 251, 259 (1992) (citing the General Allotment
Act. 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1994)). Recent lower federal court cases have disagreed whether alienability
automatically subjects property owned by a tribe or individual Indians to non-tribal property taxes. Compare
United States ex rel. Saginaw Chippewa Tribe v. Michigan, 882 F. Supp. 659, 668, 677 (E.D. Mich. 1995)
(holding that lands owned in unrestricted fee simple absolute were not reservation lands and were therefore
subject to an ad valorem tax), and Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County, 5 F.3d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir. 1993)
(alienable land is taxable), with Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 855 F. Supp. at 1202 (county and state could not
directly tax real property interests held by the tribe in fee simple within the reservation).
The Supreme Court, however, has not considered the extent to which a parcel's alienability affects tribal
legislative jurisdiction over that land. Although the Court's opinion in Yakima suggests that alienability
automatically removes the immunity from state taxes ordinarily extended to Indian lands, see Yakima, 502 U.S.
at 258 (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973)), that principle has not been raised
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B.

Expansive Judicial Endorsement of Tribal Adjudicatory Jurisdiction
In sharp contrast to current judicial restrictions on tribal legislative power over fee
land owned by non-Indians, the Supreme Court's decisions in National Farmers
Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe6 and Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v.
LaPlante37 contained almost glowing praise of expansive tribal power to adjudicate
disputes involving non-Indians. In its articulation of the doctrine requiring
exhaustion of tribal court remedies,38 the Court announced a presumption that
appears starkly at odds with Montana'spresumed divestment of tribal regulatory
power over non-Indians. The Court's Iowa Mutual presumption, in fact, is
unequivocally pro-tribal: "Civil jurisdiction over [the activities of non-Indians on
reservation lands] presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limited
by a specific treaty provision or federal statute. 39 In other passages of its
exhaustion opinions, the Court variously stressed congressional commitment "to a
policy of supporting tribal self-government and self-determination," 4 the tribal
courts' "vital role in tribal self-government,"'', and the need for non-Indian
"respect for tribal legal institutions. ' Taken in its totality, the language in the
Court's exhaustion decisions suggests broad federal court deference to and
recognition of wide-ranging tribal court adjudicatory power.
In the aftermath of these opinions, lower federal courts have ordered exhaustion
of tribal remedies in cases challenging assertions of tribal power over nonIndians, 43 in cases involving numerous off-reservation contacts and interests,4

to challenge a tribe's retained sovereignty over those alienable lands owned in fee by individual Indians.
Instead, the Court appears to limit the loss of legislative jurisdiction to tribal lands transferred to non-Indians.
See Bourland, 508 U.S. at 692 ("When Congress has broadly opened up such land to non-Indians, the effect of
the transfer is the destruction of pre-existing Indian rights to regulatory control.").
36. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
37. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
38. For a discussion and critique of the tribal exhaustion of remedies doctrine, see, e.g., Robert N. Clinton,
Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Questfor a Decolonized FederalIndian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77,
150-53 (1993); Philip P. Frickey, CongressionalIntent, PracticalReasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal
Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1137, 1232-39 (1990); Gould, supra note 33, at 881-83; Timothy W. Joranko,
Exhaustion of TribalRemedies in the Lower Courts After National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual: Toward a
Consistent Treatment of Tribal Courts by the FederalJudicial System, 78 MINN. L. REV. 259 (1993); Frank
Pommersheim, The Crucibleof Sovereignty: Analyzing Issues of TribalJurisdiction,31 ARIZ. L. REV. 329 (1989);
Laurie Reynolds, Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies: Extolling Tribal Sovereignty While Expanding Federal
Jurisdiction,73 N.C. L. REv. 1089 (1995); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Deference Owed Tribal Courts'Jurisdictional
Determinations: Towards Co-existence, Understanding, and Respect Between Different Cultural and Judicial
Norms, 24 N.M. L. REV. 191 (1994); Lynn H. Slade, DisputeResolution in Indian Country: Harmonizing National
Farmers Union, Iowa Mutual, and the Abstention Doctrine in the FederalCourts, 71 N.D. L. REV. 519 (1995);
Michael Taylor, Modem Practicein the Indian Courts, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 231 (1987).
39. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 18.
40. National Farmers,471 U.S. at 856.
41. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 14.
42. Id at 16.
43. See, e.g., Reservation Tel. Coop. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, 76 F.3d
181 (8th Cir. 1996) (requiring exhaustion of tribal remedies for a non-Indian challenge to a tribal telephone tax);
Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995) (requiring exhaustion of
remedies to allow the tribal court the opportunity to rule on the legitimacy of the application of a tribal tax to
a non-Indian mine not located on tribal reservation land, but located within Indian country; instructing the federal
district court that, on remand, exhaustion would be required if the district court concluded that the land at issue
is Indian country under 18 U.S.C. section 1151 (1994)); Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the
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and in cases raising challenges under federal law.45 In fact, one dissenting Ninth
Circuit judge criticized the breadth of lower court exhaustion orders as applying
Although some
to any "[t]alismanic invocation of tribal court jurisdiction."
courts have refused to require exhaustion by carving out exceptions for cases in
which no tribal proceedings were ongoing,4 7 in which the parties asserted
preliminary jurisdictional challenges to the tribe's power,48 or in which the
federal court concluded that tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction had been preempted
so long as
by federal law,49 most courts have been quick to order exhaustion
''5°or "plausible."' '
tribal power to adjudicate the dispute was at least "colorable
In general, then, lower federal courts routinely defer to their tribal counterparts
for preliminary resolution of wide-ranging adjudications involving non-Indians,
52
events occurring off the reservation, and difficult questions of federal law.
C. Reconciling the Two Presumptions
Montana's "general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian
tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe ' 53 and Iowa
Mutual's statement that "[c]ivil jurisdiction over [the activities of non-Indians on

Fort Berthold Reservation, 27 F.3d 1294 (8th Cir. 1994) (requiring exhaustion of remedies in a challenge to
tribal tax and tribal employment preference ordinance); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Crow Tribal Council, 940 F.2d
1239 (9th Cir. 1991) (requiring exhaustion of remedies in a non-Indian challenge to the tribe's ability to regulate
non-Indian railroad lines passing through the reservation).
44. See, e.g., Bank of Oklahoma v. Muscogee, 972 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1992); Stock West Corp. v. Taylor,
964 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc), affig in part and vacating in part,737 F. Supp. 601 (D. Or. 1990).
45. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Blackfeet Tribe, 924 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1991); Kerr-McGee Corp.
v. Farley, 915 F. Supp. 273 (D.N.M. 1995).
46. Stock West, 964 F.2d at 921 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
47. See, e.g., Blackfeet Tribe, 924 F.2d 899; Weeks Constr., Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth., 797 F.2d 668
(8th Cir. 1986); Ute Distribution Corp. v. Secretary of the Interior, 934 F. Supp. 1302 (D. Utah 1996). But see
Krempel v. Prairie Island Indian Community, 888 F. Supp. 106 (D. Minn. 1995) (ordering exhaustion of tribal
remedies, even though the tribal court system was not operational on the date the lawsuit was filed); accord
Duncan Energy Co., 27 F.3d 1294 (ordering exhaustion of tribal remedies, even though no proceedings had been
filed in tribal court); Crawford v. Genuine Parts Co., 947 F.2d 1405, 1407 (9th Cir. 1991) (same).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Yakima Tribal Court, 806 F.2d 853, 860 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Where the tribal
court lacks jurisdiction ... exhaustion is not required.").
49. See, e.g., Northern States Power Co. v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian Community, 991 F.2d
458 (8th Cir. 1993); Blue Legs v. United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1989); Ute
Distribution, 934 F. Supp. 1302.
50. Stock West, 964 F.2d at 920; see Espil v. Sells, 847 F. Supp. 752, 758 (D. Ariz. 1994) (applying Stock
West's "colorable" standard); Cropmate Co. v. Indian Resources, Int'l, 840 F. Supp. 744, 747 (D. Mont. 1993)
(same).
51. Stock West, 964 F.2d at 919 (citing A & A Concrete, Inc. v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 782 F.2d
1411, 1415-16 (9th Cir. 1986)).
52. One author states that the lower courts "have almost unanimously treated the exhaustion requirement
as mandatory." Dussias, supra note 33, at 55; see also id. at 97 n.235 (citing numerous exhaustion cases). For
more recent cases ordering exhaustion of tribal remedies in a wide array of factual circumstances, see
Reservation Telephone Cooperativev. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort BertholdReservation, 76 F.3d 181 (8th
Cir. 1996); Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Farley, 915 F. Supp. 273 (D.N.M. 1995); AG Organic Inc., v. John, 892 F.
Supp. 466 (W.D.N.Y. 1995); and Warn v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, 858 F. Supp. 524 (W.D.N.C.
1994). In a recent attempt to identify a unifying principle for the exhaustion cases, the Tenth Circuit has
proposed a "sliding scale" analysis. See Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531, 1537
(10th Cir. 1995). The court reasoned that federal court abstention to allow exhaustion of tribal remedies depends
on an assessment of the tribe's interest in adjudicating the lawsuit. See id. As on-reservation contacts increase,
the policies behind exhaustion are more obviously served by federal court abstention. See id.
53. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
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reservation lands] presumptively lies in the tribal courts .. ."5 articulate flatly
inconsistent viewpoints about the extent and breadth of tribal powers. 55 Courts
and commentators reconcile these divergent characterizations by adopting one of
two conflicting doctrinal approaches.
One approach concludes that Iowa Mutual's pro-tribal rhetoric must be filtered
through the Montana restrictions. This approach essentially limits tribal court
adjudications to instances in which tribal legislative jurisdiction would be
permissible under Montana'sgeneral prohibition of tribal power over non-Indians.
Under this approach, before a tribal court can even presume to adjudicate a
controversy, it must establish that tribal adjudication advances an important tribal
interest, or even, perhaps, that non-tribal adjudication would have a "demonstrably
serious" impact or "imperil" tribal sovereignty.56
The alternative approach seeks to draw a clear line to separate the two types
of cases. In this analysis, the Montana presumption applies only to delineate the
scope of tribal court regulatory or legislative power. Iowa Mutual's presumption
in favor of tribal jurisdiction, in contrast, applies to define an expansive tribal
adjudicatory power. Both approaches have garnered some support in the courts
and in the literature.
1. Restricting Adjudicatory Jurisdiction by Application of Montana
If a court applies Montana'srestricted definition of tribal legislative jurisdiction
to disputes over tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction, the scope of tribal
adjudicatory power becomes extremely narrow. As a matter of standard doctrinal
analysis, however, this approach appears reasonable-after all, the Supreme Court
has never distinguished one type of tribal jurisdiction from another." As an
implementation of the Supreme Court's oft-stated commitment to a vigorous tribal
court system, though, the approach seems unnecessarily crimped and restrictive.
And, in fact, the decisions adopting this view seem intent on continuing down a
path destined to reduce tribal court adjudications to cases involving only tribal
members involved in exclusively on-reservation disputes. A review of several
lower court holdings confirms this trend.
In its recent decision in A-] Contractorsv. Strate,58 the Eighth Circuit became
the first federal appellate court to explicitly hold that tribal court adjudications are
valid only if they meet the Montana standards for tribal assertions of
"jurisdiction" over non-Indians. In this case, a non-Indian woman and her Indian
children filed suit in tribal court against a non-Indian for personal injuries suffered
54. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480.U.S. 9, 18 (1987).
55. The pro-tribal presumption articulated in the tribal remedies exhaustion cases stands in even starker
contrast to Montana by virtue of the fact that the lawsuit referred to the tribal court in National Farmers Union
Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 846 (1985), arose on land owned in fee by non-Indians-that is,
precisely the land over which the Montana presumption operates to strip tribal legislative power. In Iowa
Mutual, in which the Court extended the exhaustion rule to diversity cases, the Court, somewhat surprisingly
perhaps, did not reveal whether the accident arose on tribal or non-tribal land. The facts state merely that the
accident occurred on a highway that runs through the reservation. See Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 11.
56. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 431 (1989).
57. See Estate of Tasunke Witko v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 23 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Lawyer
Training Program) 6104, 6105 (Rosebud Sioux S. Ct. 1996).
58. 76 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1996), aftid, Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 117 S.Ct. 1404 (1997).
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in a traffic accident that occurred on a state highway within the exterior borders
of the reservation. 59 The tribe's trial and appellate courts had upheld their
authority to adjudicate the controversy pursuant to the tribe's jurisdictional
code' and long arm statute. 6 As the tribal appellate court noted, adjudication
of this controversy effectuated the tribe's strong, yet unremarkable, sovereign
interest "in providing a forum for peacefully resolving disputes that arise in their
geographic jurisdiction and protecting the rights of those who are injured within
such jurisdiction.' 62
Unhappy with the tribal court ruling, the non-Indian defendants filed suit in
federal court against the tribal judge to challenge his jurisdictional decision. The
district court upheld the tribal court's assertion of adjudicatory jurisdiction, noting
simply that the plaintiff had "exercised a discretionary choice of forum." 63 In
its original panel opinion, the Eighth Circuit agreed and stressed the tribe's
interests in "protecting the health and safety of its members and residents on the
roads and highways on the reservation"' and in "affording those who have been
injured in accidents on those roads and highways with a judicial remedy."65
Thus, the panel opinion refused to interfere with tribal proceedings and ordered
the parties to return to tribal court for resolution of the merits of the dispute.
However, in its en banc reversal in A-] Contractors v. Strate,6 the Eighth
Circuit held that the tribal court had no subject matter jurisdiction over the
pending litigation. Adopting the analysis urged by the non-Indians objecting to
tribal court adjudication, the court first emphasized that the Supreme Court's
Montana standard for divestment of tribal powers applied to the dispute. 6
Although the Eighth Circuit has recognized the clear doctrinal distinction between
legislative jurisdiction and adjudicatory jurisdiction outside the field of Indian
law,6 it chose to ignore the difference in A-] Contractors. In response to the
tribal defendants' attempt to distinguish the narrow limits of tribal regulatory
power delineated in Montana from the far broader contours of tribal jurisdiction
59. See id at 932. No court has yet ruled on whether a tribal court may resolve the consortium claims of
the injured plaintiff's children, who are tribal members. See id.
60. See Fredericks v. Continental Western Ins. Co., 20 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Lawyer Training
Program) 6009, 6010 (N. Plains Intertribal Ct. App. 1992) (citing THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES TRIBAL CODE,
Jurisdiction of the Courts, ch. 1. § 3.) In the trial and appellate courts' opinions, the tribal system acquired
subject matter jurisdiction based on tribal law providing for adjudication of cases "arising within the exterior
boundaries of the reservation." Id.
61. The defendant non-Indian driver was employed by a corporation engaged in business with the tribe and
the alleged tort occurred within the reservation, thus triggering tribal court personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. See Fredericks, 20 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Lawyer Training Program) at 6010 (citing THREE
AFFILIATED TRIBES TRIBAL CODE, Long Arm Statute, ch. 2, § 3(f)).
62. Id
63. See A-I Contractors v. Strate, 19 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Lawyer Training Program) 3163, 3164
(D.N.D. 1992).
64. A-I Contractors v. Strate, 1994 WL 666051, at *6 (8th Cir. 1994), opinion vacated and reversed en
banc, 76 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1996), affid, Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997).
65. Id.
66. 76 F.3d at 932.
67. See id at 934.
68. See generally McCluney v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 649 F.2d 578, 581 n.3 (8th Cir. 1981). As the
McCluney court explained: "Legislative jurisdiction does not denote simply the lawmaking power of a state;
rather it refers to the power of a state to apply its laws to any given set of facts. Judicial jurisdiction, in
contrast, is the power of a state to try a particular action in its courts." Id.
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to adjudicate as praised in National Farmersand Iowa Mutual, the Eighth Circuit
characterized the distinction as "illusory."' Recognizing that some of the protribal language from the latter line of cases "can be viewed in isolation to create
a tension with Montana,"70 the A-I Contractors court nevertheless insisted that
they be read together
to establish one comprehensive and integrated rule[.] [A] valid tribal interest
[as required in Montana] must be at issue before a tribal court may exercise
civil jurisdiction over a non-Indian or nonmember, but once the tribal interest
is established [the Iowa Mutual] presumption arises that tribal courts have
jurisdiction over the non-Indian or nonmember unless that jurisdiction is
affirmatively limited by federal law. 7

Analyzing the facts of the case before it, the Eighth Circuit concluded that
neither Montana exception applied. Noting that the accident occurred on a state
highway and involved two non-Indians, the court found the dispute "distinctively
non-tribal in nature."72 Turning to the specific Montana exceptions, the court
first rejected the tribal judge's conclusion that adjudication was permissible under
Montana's allowance for tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians who enter a
voluntary relationship with the tribe.73 Although the tribal court defendant was
an employee of a corporation that had contracted to do business with the tribe,74
the Eighth Circuit appeared to limit the "consensual relationship" exception 75 to
disputes arising directly out of that contractual relationship. Because the injured
person was not a party to the contract, and because the tribe was not involved in
the accident, the court concluded that the first Montana exception did not
apply.76

Similarly, the court rejected the argument that tribal adjudication met
Montana's second exception, which allows tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian
69. See A-I Contractors, 76 F.3d at 938. In the A-I Contractors court's view, "if the tribal court tried this
suit, it essentially would be acting in both an adjudicatory capacity and regulatory capacity .... IT]he tribal
court ...

would have the power to decide what substantive law applies .... Thus, while adjudicating the

dispute, the tribal court also would be regulating the legal conduct of drivers on the roads... that traverse the
reservation." IL As evidenced by the above quotation, the A-i Contractors court ignored the fact that "[c]ases
are commonly adjudicated in forums that would lack the authority to regulate the subject matter of the disputes."
National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 736 F.2d 1320, 1322 n.3 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 471 U.S. 845
(1985); see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
70. A-] Contractors, 76 F.3d at 938-39.
71. Id at 939. In fact, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the strong pro-tribal court presumption articulated
in the Supreme Court's exhaustion cases applies only to tribal court adjudication of disputes arising on tribal
land. See id.at 936. However, such an interpretation of the exhaustion rule is impossible. The dispute in
National Farmers involved an accident on a school located on the reservation-but on land owned in fee by the
state. See Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. at 847. Under Montana, tribal regulatory power over activities occurring on
school property is extremely doubtful. See generally discussion supra Part II.A. Nevertheless, the National
Farmers Court articulated the pro-tribal court presumption to apply in precisely a situation in which, under
Montana, the tribe is unlikely to have the power to regulate.
72. A-i Contractors, 76 F.3d at 940.
73. See iSd
74. Although the majority refused to concede that the accident occurred while the defendant was performing
work required under the contract with the tribe, 76 F.3d at 933 n.l, as one dissenting judge pointed out, that is
the only "plausible explanation as to why a gravel truck owned by A-I ...was on tribal land at the time of the
collision." Id. at 945 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
75. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
76. See A-i Contractors, 76 F.3d at 940.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 27

conduct that "threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."" The Eighth Circuit
refused to recognize the tribe's professed sovereign interest in exercising "full
sovereign authority over events that happen within its geographical boundaries. ' 8
Nor did the injured party's identity as a resident of the reservation, widow of a tribal
member, and mother of tribal members satisfy the court that any valid tribal interest
was at stake in the controversy.79 For the Eighth Circuit, then, the only forum open
to the injured party was a North Dakota state court, even though she desired to
adjudicate her case in a tribal forum.
The Eighth Circuit's en banc holding in A-I Contractorsproduced three separate
dissenting opinions, each one joined by the same four judges.80 Although each
dissenting opinion adopts a slightly different emphasis in its attack on the majority
opinion, the dissenting opinions are uniform in their strong criticism of the
majority's refusal to allow the tribal court system to adjudicate a dispute arising on
the reservation between a reservation resident and a nonresident employee of a tribal
contractor. For the dissenters, the sovereign interest at stake was indeed important:
"The power to adjudicate everyday disputes occurring within a nation's own
territory is among the most basic and indispensable manifestations of sovereign
power."8' Arguing that the Supreme Court's Montana rule should apply only to
limit tribal sovereignty over non-Indians who own land in fee within the
reservation," the dissenters stressed the important geographical component of
tribal sovereignty" a and urged the application of Iowa Mutual's pro-tribal court
presumption.'
For the dissenters, the majority's holding created serious tension and
inconsistencies with other areas of Indian law. Two of the dissenting judges
noted that state court adjudication of the dispute might violate the line of cases
in which the Supreme Court has prohibited state judicial jurisdiction when it
would infringe upon a tribe's ability to govern itself8" In addition, one

77. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
78. A-] Contractors, 76 F.3d at 940.
79. See id
80. See id at 941, 943, 945 (Beam, J.,
dissenting, joined by Gibson, McMillian, & Murphy, J].;
Gibson,
J.,
dissenting, joined by Beam, McMillian, & Murphy, JJ.;
McMillian, J.,
dissenting, joined by Beam, Gibson,
& Murphy, JJ.).
81. Id at 944 (Gibson, J., dissenting); see id at 941 (Beam, J., dissenting) ("A legitimate judicial system
arises as an attribute of sovereignty.").
82. See id at 944 (Gibson, J., dissenting), 946 (McMillian, J.,
dissenting).
83. "[Gleography plays a vital role in a tribe's political integrity ..
ld
d.."
at 942 (Beam, J., dissenting).
Recent scholarship has demonstrated, however, that the geographical component of tribal legislative jurisdiction
is becoming more and more irrelevant to the Court's analysis of tribal sovereignty. Tribal membership and nonIndian consent to tribal sovereignty have become the dominant factors. See generally Dussias, supra note 33;
Gould, supra note 33.
84. See A-) Contractors, 76 F.3d at 945 (McMillian, J.,dissenting). Conceding the applicability of
Montana for the sake of argument, the dissenters found tribal court adjudication was proper either under
Montana's "consensual relationship" exception, id at 944 (Gibson, J.,dissenting), 950 (McMillian, J.,
dissenting), or its "important tribal interest" exception, id. at 941 (Beam, J.,dissenting), 945 (Gibson, J.,
dissenting), 950 (McMillian, J.,
dissenting).
85. See A-I Contractors,76 F.3d at 943-44 (Beam, J.,
dissenting), 950 (McMillian, J.,
dissenting). These
portions of the dissents refer to Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), in which the Supreme Court held that the
Arizona state court system was powerless to resolve an on-reservation dispute because to do so "would
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dissenting judge criticized the majority rule for the tension it creates with the
National Farmers and Iowa Mutual rule of exhaustion of tribal remedies.86 If
a tribal court's power is so severely limited as to preclude adjudication of a
personal injury case in an on-reservation accident involving a reservation resident
and a tribal subcontractor, the dissenting judge opined, it is pointless to require
exhaustion of tribal remedies." Moreover, the dissenter reasoned, the Supreme
Court's exhaustion cases clearly establish tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction over nonIndians.88 The A-] Contractors holding, then, circumvents those Supreme Court
decisions by removing tribal jurisdiction over the very cases the Court's
exhaustion doctrine has already sent to tribal court.
More recently, the Ninth Circuit squarely adopted the Eighth Circuit's A-1
Contractor'sholding and rationale. In Yellowstone County v. Pease,89 the Ninth
Circuit held that a tribal court was powerless to adjudicate a lawsuit filed by a
tribal member to challenge the applicability of county property taxes to land he
owned in fee within the exterior boundaries of the reservation.' Refusing to
recognize a distinction between regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction, the court
characterized A-1 Contractorsas "persuasive" 9' and concluded that the Montana
analysis applied to divest the tribal court of jurisdiction over the lawsuit. 92 At
least one state supreme court 93 and one tribal court' have also adopted the A-]

undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right of
the Indians to govern themselves." Williams, 358 U.S. at 223.
86. See A-] Contractors,76 F.3d at 946 (McMillian, J., dissenting).

87. See id. at 949 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
88. See id.
89. 96 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1996). Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit was actually one of the first courts to
articulate the distinction between legislative and adjudicatory jurisdiction in a meaningful way in federal Indian law.
In NationalFarmersUnionInsurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 736 F.2d 1320(9th Cir. 1984), rev'd. 471 U.S.
845 (1985), the Ninth Circuit justified the distinction and noted its unremarkable import: "Cases are commonly
adjudicated in forums that would lack the authority to regulate the subject matter of the disputes." 736 F.2d at 1322
n.3.
90. The tribal court concluded that Pease's land was immune from the tax, notwithstanding the Supreme
Court's decision in County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251
(1992), upholding the validity of non-tribal property taxes as applied to land owned in fee by Indians pursuant
to the General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331334, 339, 341, 342, 348, 349, 381 (1994)). Distinguishing Yakima, the tribal court in Yellowstone County v.
Pease, 96 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1996), held that under the tribe-specific Crow Allotment Act of 1920, 41 Stat.
751 (1920), the fee land owned by Pease was immune from the disputed taxes. See Pease, 96 F.3d at 1171
(discussing tribal court opinion).
91. Pease, 96 F.3d at 1175.
92. See id. at 1174. In Pease, the Ninth Circuit narrowly construed its recent, earlier opinion in Hinshaw
v. Mahler, 42 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 1994). In Hinshaw, the court had upheld tribal adjudication of a lawsuit filed
against a nonmember by a nonmember parent of a deceased tribal member who had been killed in a car accident
that occurred on a United States highway on the reservation. See 42 F.3d at 1179. In Hinshaw, the Ninth Circuit
stressed that "the Tribes have not surrendered their authority to exercise jurisdiction over civil actions involving
nonmembers." Id. at 1180. Although the Ninth Circuit concluded that Hinshaw was inapplicable to the dispute
in Pease, the distinctions articulated by the court are unpersuasive and do not convincingly distinguish Hinshaw
from the A-I Contractorsholding. See Pease, 96 F.3d at 1176. For another case in which the court appeared
to favor this approach to disputes over the scope of a tribal court's power to adjudicate, see Wilson v.
Marchington,934 F. Supp. 1176 (D. Mont. 1995) (urging applicability of the Montana analysis to the dispute,
but noting that the Ninth Circuit's holding in Hinshaw appeared to require the opposite result).
93. See Red Fox v. Hettich, 494 N.W.2d 638 (S.D. 1993). The South Dakota Supreme Court concluded
that the tribal court's judgment in an on-reservation personal injury dispute was not enforceable by the South
Dakota courts because the tribe had no jurisdiction over the lawsuit. See id. In the Red Fox court's opinion, a
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Contractors analysis. In addition, the A-i Contractors approach has been
endorsed by the American Indian Law Deskbook, a publication by a group of
western state attorneys general advocating limiting tribal adjudications to those
instances under Montana in which the tribe can regulate the conduct at issue in
the lawsuit.9"
2. Distinguishing Legislative Jurisdiction from Adjudicative Jurisdiction
An alternative approach to the conflicting presumptions limits Montana to
disputes challenging tribal legislative jurisdiction to regulate non-Indian and
nonmember conduct. In addition, this approach applies Iowa Mutual's
presumption to determine the scope of tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction, thus
removing the existing barriers to the full development of a tribe's ability to
resolve disputes arising on the reservation, involving Indians, or otherwise
implicating a valid tribal sovereign interest.
Admittedly, this more expansive attitude toward tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction
has attracted only minimal support in the caselaw and in the literature." One
recent tribal appellate court decision explicitly separated the issues and applied
the Iowa Mutual presumption to uphold tribal court adjudication of a lawsuit filed
by the heirs of Tasunke Witko, popularly known as Crazy Horse, against the
manufacturers of Crazy Horse Malt Liquor.97 Conceding that the Supreme Court
has never made an explicit distinction between tribal legislative jurisdiction and
adjudicatory jurisdiction, the tribal court nevertheless concluded that separation

tribe can adjudicate only those disputes in which substantive tribal law would apply; that is, unless a Montana
analysis would support the assertion of tribal regulatory power over the litigants' behavior, a tribal court has no
power to adjudicate an on-reservation dispute. See id. at 643.
94. See Lefevre v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 23 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Lawyer Training Program)
6018, 6019 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Court, Gaming Enter. Div. 1992).
95. See generally CONFERENCE OF WESTERN ATTORNEYS GENERAL, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK
(Nicholas J. Spaeth et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter DESKBOOK]. Professor Joseph Singer's extremely critical
review of the book described it as "an extended brief for the continued expansion of state power in Indian
country." Joseph William Singer, Remembering What Hurts Us Most: A Critique of the American Indian Law
Deskbook, 24 N.M. L. REV. 315 (1994). In that review, Professor Singer vigorously rejected the DEKBOOK
authors' assertion that National Farmers' and Iowa Mutual's broad protection of tribal court adjudicatory power
should be subjected to Montana's narrow definition of tribal regulatory power. See generally i.
96. Several commentators have argued that the scope of a tribal court's adjudicatory powers should be
determined by application of Iowa Mutual's presumption that "[c]ivil jurisdiction over [the activities of nonIndians on reservation lands]... presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific
treaty provision or federal statute," Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9. 18 (1987). For example, one
commentator's criticism of the "troubling, doctrinal incoherence of many courts ... in their analysis of tribal
jurisdiction issues" highlighted the "continuing inability of many courts to make the important distinction
"Frank Pommersheim, Introduction:
between legislative/regulatoryjurisdiction and adjudicatory jurisdiction..
A Symposium on Tribal Courts, 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1994). Another Indian law scholar has stressed
that "[t]he ruling in Montana related to legislative jurisdiction nor adjudicative jurisdiction." Singer, supra note
17, at 27; see Reynolds, supra note 38, at 1128-30, 1141-52 (arguing that Montana and the other Supreme Court
legislative jurisdiction cases should not apply to further restrict National Fanners' and Iowa Mutual's..more
expansive definition of tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction). But cf.Alex Tallchief Skibine, Braid of Feathers:
Pluralism, Legitimacy, Sovereignty, and the Importance of Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 557,
574-75 (1996) (book review) (reviewing POMMERSHEIM, supra note 17; agreeing that adjudicatory jurisdiction
is fundamentally different than regulatory jurisdiction, but noting the Supreme Court's failure to make that
distinction).
97. See Estate of Tasunke Witko v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 23 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Training
Program) 6104, 6105 (Rosebud Sioux S. Ct. 1996).
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of the two lines of cases was the most satisfactory way to reconcile the
narrowness of Montana with the expansive language of Iowa Mutual.9"
Less directly, federal courts in the Tenth Circuit have implicitly found a
meaningful distinction between legislative and adjudicatory jurisdiction in Indian
law. In its recent holding in Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman,
the Tenth Circuit stated that the Montana analysis should apply only to evaluate
disputed assertions of inherent tribal sovereign power to regulate non-Indian
conduct.9 In that case, non-Indian mining companies filed suit in federal court
to challenge the ability of the Navajo Nation to impose its business activity tax
on mining activities conducted on land located outside the borders of the
reservation."° The Navajo Nation objected to the federal court's adjudication
of the challenge, arguing that under the Supreme Court's rules of tribal exhaustion
of remedies, the federal court should abstain to allow tribal resolution of the
controversy.' 0' In its remand to the district court, the Tenth Circuit held that if
the land in question is found to constitute Indian country under federal law,t °2
the exhaustion rule would require the parties to challenge the tribal tax in tribal
court. 0 3 Rejecting the non-Indians' argument that Montana compelled the
conclusion that the tribal court could not adjudicate the controversy, the court
stated: "The question is not whether the Navajo Nation possesses inherent
authority as a sovereign to tax.. . ." Montana and its progeny, in the Tenth
Circuit's view, apply instead to disputes over "the inherent authority of Indian
tribes... to regulate non-Indian activities on non-Indian lands."'0 5
In a similar vein, in Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Farley,'°6 a New Mexico federal
district court concluded that "whatever the proper substantive law may be, it is
separate and apart from the [adjudicatory] jurisdictional question."'0 In that
case, tribal members filed suit in tribal court for damages arising out of a nonIndian corporation's allegedly negligent operation of a uranium processing mill
located on tribal land within the reservation." °s The defendants argued that
exhaustion of tribal remedies was inappropriate because the basis of the lawsuit
was an alleged violation of federal statutory law."' Sympathetic to the
defendants' argument that the Price-Anderson Act" 0 was the only applicable

98. See id at 6112. The court also found that the Montana exceptions were met. See id It bears noting
that one of the justices of the Rosebud Sioux Supreme Court is Frank Pommersheim, a well-known Indian law
scholar whose scholarship has urged the distinction adopted by the court in this case. See generally
POMMERSHEIM, supra note 17, at 82-95; Pommersheim, supra note 96, at 3.
99. See 52 F.3d 1531, 1540 (10th Cir. 1995).
100. See id. at 1534.
101. See id (citing National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985); Iowa
Mutual, 480 U.S. 9).
102. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151; see also supra note 21.
103. See Watchman, 52 F.3d at 1546.
104. Id. at 1540 & n.9 and cases cited therein.
105. 1d
106. 915 F. Supp. 273 (D.N.M. 1995).
107. Id. at 279 n.9.
108. See id at 275.
109. See id
110. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011, 2012, 2014, 2039, 2073, 2210, 2232, 2239 (1994) (establishing a federal cause ofaction as a means of litigating nuclear torts).
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substantive law, the court nevertheless decided to abstain to allow tribal court
adjudication, noting that "even assuming Price-Anderson is the only means of
litigating nuclear torts, this does not establish that tribal courts are without
jurisdiction to apply Price-Anderson.""' In the Kerr-McGee Corp. court's
view, then, whether the tribal court could apply its own substantive law to the
it."12
dispute was irrelevant to the scope of tribal adjudicatory power to resolve
The Watchman and Kerr-McGee Corp. courts limit Montana to disputes over a
tribe's ability to impose its substantive law to regulate the conduct of nonIndians." 3 At the same time, they are willing to recognize that, under applicable
Supreme Court precedent, a tribal court's ability to adjudicate a controversy is far
more expansive than its ability to regulate the conduct giving rise to that controversy. 4
D. Deciphering What the Supreme Court Means
Although the United States Supreme Court has failed to explicitly recognize the
distinction between tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction and regulatory jurisdiction as
a way of reconciling what otherwise appear to be fundamentally inconsistent
conceptions of retained tribal sovereignty, the Court has in fact treated challenges
to tribal jurisdiction differently, depending on whether the case involved
regulatory or adjudicatory jurisdiction. This inconsistency leaves the lower
federal courts in the difficult position of deciding whether to do what the Supreme
Court says or to do what the Supreme Court does.
Starting with Johnson v. McIntosh'1 and continuing to the present, the
Supreme Court has consistently recognized that disputed assertions of tribal
regulatory power constitute federal questions appropriate for federal court
resolution." 6 The Court's opinions in National Farmers and Iowa Mutual, the
only Supreme Court cases involving challenges to a tribe's adjudicatory
jurisdiction that have worked their way through the federal court system, stand
alone in their insistence that challenges to tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction are
better resolved, initially at least, by the tribal courts. Moreover, in the wake of the
latter two cases, the Court has not tried to reconcile the inconsistencies of the two
presumptions.
In practice, however, the Court has applied only the Montana presumption to
resolve disputes over tribal legislative power. Not only has the Court ignored
the pro-tribal sovereignty presumption articulated in its exhaustion cases, it has
failed even to consider whether exhaustion of tribal remedies would have been
appropriate in any of the legislative jurisdiction cases. Thus, in cases like

111. Kerr-McGee Corp., 915 F. Supp. at 279.
112. See id at 277.
113. See Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531, 1540 (10th Cir. 1995); KerrMcGee Corp., 915 F. Supp. at 277.
114. See Watchman, 52 F.3d at 1546; Kerr-McGee Corp., 915 F. Supp. at 279.
115. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (holding that United States courts had no power to uphold tribal
authorization to convey land title in derogation of title granted by the United States).
116. See, e.g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
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Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians,"7 Brendale v. Confederated
Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation"' and South Dakota v. Bourland,"9 all cases involving disputes over the scope of a tribe's regulatory power
over non-Indians, the Court applied Montana's presumption and ignored Iowa
Mutual's and National Farmers' exhaustion presumption, which would have supported tribal jurisdiction. Implicit in the Court's analysis, then, is the recognition
that the two lines of cases are indeed distinct and apply to two substantively
different types of legal issues.
In addition, recent Supreme Court caselaw is replete with suggestions that it
does recognize the distinction between the two types of tribal jurisdiction. For
instance, in its exhaustion opinion in Iowa Mutual, the Court noted that tribal
"adjudicative jurisdiction was coextensive with its legislative jurisdiction.""
In addition, three members of the Court in Brendale suggested that the exhaustion
rule itself was applicable only to cases involving challenges to a tribe's
adjudicatory, and not legislative, jurisdiction. 12' And finally, the Supreme
Court's recent opinion in Bourland stressed repeatedly that regulatory, and not
adjudicatory, jurisdiction was at issue: "The abrogation of [a tribe's "former right
of absolute and exclusive use and occupation of land] implies" the loss of
regulatory jurisdiction over the use of the land by others.' 22
In a related Indian law issue, the Supreme Court has already confirmed that the
distinction between legislative and adjudicatory jurisdiction is crucial. In its
major decision interpreting the scope of what is commonly known as P.L.
280,12 a federal law transferring broad powers from tribal to state governments,
the Court limited the legislation's reach by construing it to apply only to civil
adjudicatory jurisdiction. This decision, Bryan v. Itasca County, 24 squarely
held that P.L. 280 did not transfer to California general legislative jurisdiction to
impose its laws on Indian lands; rather, the Court concluded that the law's

117. 471 U.S. 195 (1985) (challenge to tribal tax filed by a non-Indian lessee of tribal property).
Interestingly. Kerr-McGee Corp. was decided during the same term as National Farmers, yet the Court made
no mention of the appropriateness of tribal exhaustion in that case.
118. 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (holding that the tribe had no power to zone non-Indian lands in the "open" portion
of the reservation).
119. 508 U.S. 679 (1993) (holding that the tribe could not regulate hunting and fishing activities of
nonmembers on land within the exterior borders of the reservation that had been taken by the federal government
for a dam and reservoir project).
120. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 12. Although it suggests that the Court does indeed distinguish the two types
of jurisdiction, this statement creates a different uncertainty with respect to the exhaustion rule. See Reynolds,
supra note 38, at 1144 n.273.
121. See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 455 n.5 (Blackmun, J., joined in plurality decision by Brennan & Marshall,
JJ.) (describing exhaustion cases as requiring "that the issue of jurisdiction over a civil suit brought against a
non-Indian arising from a tort occurring on reservation land must be resolved in the tribal courts in the first
instance").
122. Bourland,508 U.S. at 689. In fact, the Court repeatedly referred to tribal "regulatory jurisdiction," id
at 685 n.6, 689, 691 & n.12, 695; "regulatory control," id. at 691 & n.12, 692, 695, 696, 697; and "regulatory
authority," id. at 686 (quoting South Dakota v. Bourland, 949 F.2d 984, 995 (8th Cir. 1991)), 687 n.8, 689 n.9,
691 n.11, 692 n.13, 693, 694, 696, and 703 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
123. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(16) (1994).
124. 426 U.S. 373 (1976); see Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism,
Constitutionalism,and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 429-37 (1993) (using
Bryan as an example of how the Burger Court embraced Justice Marshall's notions of tribal sovereignty as
reflected in his Indian law opinions).
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transfer of civil "jurisdiction" to the states was limited to a grant of adjudicatory
jurisdiction to the state court systems.1 25 In short, the signals from the case law
are fairly strong: the Court has given several suggestions that, at least for
purposes of discussions involving tribal jurisdiction, adjudicatory jurisdiction may
be subject to quite different, and in fact far fewer, judicially imposed restrictions
than tribal legislative jurisdiction. 2 6

125. See id. And even in non-Indian law issues, the Court is grappling with the distinction between legislative
and judicial jurisdiction. Justice Scalia, dissenting in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764
(1993), stressed that legislative jurisdiction "refers to 'the authority of a state to make its law applicable to
"'Id. at 813 (quoting
persons or activities,' and is quite a separate matter from 'jurisdiction to adjudicate ....
I RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 231 (1987)).
126. Of course, a decision that the scope of tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction is not subject to Montana's
limiting anti-tribal presumption still leaves open the question of what analysis should apply to determine the
scope of tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction. The Supreme Court's National Farmers decision is quite clear in its
statement that the scope of tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction does constitute a federal question under the federal
jurisdictional statutes. See National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 852 (1985).
Beyond that, though, the analysis becomes somewhat vague. The National Farmers Court stated:
mhe existence and extent of a tribal court's jurisdiction will require a careful examination
of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which that sovereignty has been altered, divested or
diminished, as well as a detailed study of relevant statutes. Executive Branch policy as
embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and administrative or judicial decisions.
ld at 855-56. No federal statute, however, establishes federal court review of tribal court decisions. See Duncan
Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, 27 F.3d 1294, 1301-03 (8th Cir. 1994)
(Loken, J., concurring). Moreover, because tribes are not subject to federal constitutional limitations, see infra
notes 162-64 and accompanying text, the Supreme Court precedent which establishes constitutional limits on
state adjudicatory jurisdiction also would appear to be inapplicable.
One federal court of appeals has suggested that a tribe's powers of adjudication are coextensive with the
statutory definition of Indian country. See Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531
(10th Cir. 1995); see also supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussion of Indian country). In its attempt
to apply the Supreme Court's rules of exhaustion of tribal remedies, the Watchman court decided that federal
courts should defer to tribal court resolution when a lawsuit arises in Indian country. See Watchman, 52 F.3d
at 1536-37. At first blush, this may appear to be an expansive definition of tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction-after
all, it goes well beyond the Supreme Court's conception of tribal legislative jurisdiction, as it extends to
"dependent Indian communities," 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1994), and also includes significant amounts of territory
owned by non-Indians within Indian reservations, see id. § 1151(a). But, it is not immediately obvious why tribal
courts, unlike any other court of general jurisdiction, should be limited to adjudicating lawsuits that arise on land
with some strong connection to the sovereign .adjudicating the lawsuit. Thus, excluding the precedential value
of Watchman, external limits on tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction are not readily identifiable.
Tribal law itself, however, provides the fundamental basis from which to evaluate challenges to tribal
adjudicatory jurisdiction. As one commentator has noted, the concept of "territorial jurisdiction" may be an
important component in a tribe's jurisdictional statute. See Pommersheim, supra note 38, at 343. If a tribe fails to
limit its adjudicatory jurisdiction to the land located within the exterior boundaries of the reservation, though, the
tribe should be free to adjudicate cases to the full extent of its subject matter jurisdiction, which may extend beyond
the borders of the reservation to include remaining portions of Indian country. Federal courts frequently order tribal
court adjudication of exhaustion of tribal remedies cases which arise in whole or in part off the reservation, but
otherwise fall within the tribe's adjudicatory jurisdiction. See, e.g., Watchman, 52 F.3d at 1541 (concluding that,
under 18 U.S.C. section 1151, exhaustion should be ordered in any case arising in Indian country); Texaco, Inc. v.
Zah, 5 F.3d 1374 (10th Cir. 1993) (ordering exhaustion for tribal court to consider applicability of tribal tax to offreservation activity); Stock West Corp. v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc), affg in part and
vacating in part,737 F. Supp. 601 (D. Or. 1990) (ordering exhaustion despite numerous off-reservation contacts).
While external limits on tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction are not readily identifiable, tribal courts
frequently determine their jurisdictional authority in a manner similar to their state counterparts. Tribal courts
must resolve challenges to tribal court subject matter jurisdiction, see, e.g., Coeur D'Alene Tribe v. AT&T Corp.,
23 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Lawyer Training Program) 6060, 6061-64 (Coeur D'Alene Tribal Ct. 1996), and
personal jurisdiction, see, e.g., Estate of Tasunke Witko v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 23 Indian L. Rep. (Am.
Indian Lawyer Training Program) 6104,6107-11 (Rosebud Sioux S. Ct. 1996). Tribal court decisions frequently
adopt and apply well established Supreme Court precedent developed in the context of state court jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Fredericks v. Continental Western Ins. Co., 20 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Lawyer Training Program)
6009, 6011 (N. Plains Intertribal Ct. App. 1992) (discussing whether the personal jurisdiction asserted by the
tribe was in line with the United States Supreme Court's "minimum contacts" jurisprudence).
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III. THE CASE FOR DISTINGUISHING ADJUDICATORY JURISDICTION
FROM LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION
If doctrinal clarity were the only issue at stake, the need to distinguish between
adjudicatory and legislative tribal jurisdiction would hardly be urgent. It is much
more than that, however. The Supreme Court, by failing to explicitly recognize
the distinction between tribal legislative and adjudicatory jurisdiction, has
produced an unnecessarily restrictive view of tribal adjudicatory powers.
Furthermore, the Court has created inconsistencies within its own doctrine of
exhaustion of tribal remedies.
A. Restricting the Scope of Tribal Adjudications
Outside the area of Indian law, the distinction between adjudicatory and
legislative jurisdiction is well established. Legislative jurisdiction exists only if
the sovereign has "a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts,
creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair."' 27 This analysis focuses on the relationship between the
plaintiff and the sovereign whose law the plaintiff seeks to apply.1 28 Even
though application of constitutional principles of due process and full faith and
credit may preclude the exercise of legislative jurisdiction, a state may
nevertheless have adjudicatory jurisdiction to resolve the controversy before
it."2 Existence of adjudicatory jurisdiction depends on whether the forum can
assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant and on whether the forum's own
laws create subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy.' 3
Prior to the recent federal appellate holdings in A-] Contractors v. Strate 31
and Yellowstone County v. Pease, 32 lower federal courts had agreed that the
unremarkable doctrinal distinction between adjudicatory and legislative
jurisdiction applied to tribal courts as well. The Eighth Circuit, for example,
stated that "[w]hether the tribal court has subject matter jurisdiction is not
controlled by whether the applicable substantive law is tribal law or state law or
federal law. Courts often adjudicate disputes under substantive law different than
that of the forum."' 33 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit noted that "[c]ases are
commonly adjudicated in forums that would lack the authority to regulate the
subject matter of the disputes."" 4 These observations fall comfortably within
the Supreme Court's expansive presumption of tribal court adjudication as
articulated in National Farmers and Iowa Mutual.

127. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302. 313 (1980).
128. See Singer, supra note 17, at 27.
129. See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 736 F.2d 1320, 1322 n.3 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd,
471 U.S. 845 (1985); see also Hague, 449 U.S. 302.
130. See CASAD, supra note 17, § 1.01, at 1-2 to 1-9.
131. 76 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1996), affd, Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997).
132. 96 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1996).
133. A-I Contractors v. Strate, 1994 WL 666051. *6 (8th Cir. 1994), opinion vacatedand reverseden banc,
76 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1996), affd, Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997).
134. National Farmers, 736 F.2d at 1322 n.3. In fact, in National Farmers, the court rejected, as an
"untenable" assumption, the assertion that a tribe's adjudicatory jurisdiction must be coextensive with its
regulatory authority. See i
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The recent appellate decisions discussed earlier in this Article, however, clearly
illustrate the Eighth and Ninth Circuits' rejection of the split between legislative
Further, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits'
and adjudicative jurisdiction.
unwillingness to recognize the distinction between a tribe's adjudicatory and
legislative powers has a compounded negative effect. Under the Eight and Ninth
Circuits' current analysis, tribal courts are singled out to bear the limitation that
their adjudicatory jurisdiction must not exceed their legislative jurisdiction.
Layered on top of this restriction, of course, is the Montana view that tribal
legislative powers themselves are extremely narrow. If the Supreme Court is
serious in its commitment to the development of tribal courts as a vigorous and
effective dispute resolution institution that executes the federal government's
staunch support of tribal sovereignty, it must remove these artificial and
unprincipled barriers to the full development of tribal court adjudicatory powers.
Reducing the Exhaustion Doctrine to a Meaningless Exercise
In addition to the negative consequences for tribal adjudicatory powers in
general, the Court's failure to distinguish adjudicatory from legislative tribal
jurisdiction has caused tension with the lower courts' application of the Court's
own tribal exhaustion doctrine. If the Eighth and Ninth Circuits are correct in
interpreting the intersection of National Farmersand Montana as concluding that
a tribe has adjudicatory jurisdiction over only those cases to which its substantive
law would apply, then the tribal court in National Farmers itself is extremely
unlikely to have had the power to adjudicate the lawsuit remanded to it under the
Court's holding in that case.
Specifically, the accident in National Farmers occurred at a school on fee land
35
owned by the state and located within the exterior borders of the reservation.'
Under the Court's Montana analysis, the relevant presumption suggests that the
tribe had no legislative authority to regulate non-Indian conduct on that land. If
a tribe's adjudicatory jurisdiction is limited to cases in which Montana would
allow application of tribal law to the dispute, then, it would appear that the
Supreme Court created the exhaustion doctrine to refer to tribal court cases in
which the Court had already concluded that tribes were powerless to adjudicate.
It seems highly implausible that the National FarmersCourt intended to dictate
such a meaningless course of action for litigants and for tribal courts.
Nevertheless, both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have adopted this unlikely
interpretation. 36 Under this approach, both Circuits refer to tribal courts for
exhaustion purposes a wide variety of cases involving non-Indian activity on fee
land within the reservation and non-Indian activity off the reservation; yet both
Circuits have held, in their post-exhaustion cases, that tribal courts have no power
to adjudicate those cases.
For instance, in Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort
Berthold Reservation,'37 the Eighth Circuit required non-Indian plaintiffs to go
B.

135. See National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 847 (1985).
136. See A-] Contractors, 76 F.3d 930; Pease, 96 F.3d 1169.
137. 27 F.3d 1294, 1301 (8th Cir. 1994).
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first to tribal court to challenge the applicability of a tribal tax and tribal
employment ordinance to non-Indian activities occurring on fee lands within the
reservation. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, in Stock West Corp. v. Taylor,3 '
ordered a non-Indian corporation to exhaust tribal remedies in a legal malpractice
suit against a non-Indian tribal attorney. The alleged malpractice occurred in
Portland, Oregon, when the tribal attorney delivered an opinion letter to the nonIndian corporation that intended to construct and manage a tribal sawmill. 39
Yet these same courts, in their post-exhaustion review of tribal court proceedings,
have held that a tribe had no jurisdiction to adjudicate, notwithstanding numerous
reservation contacts. In A-i Contractors,the Eighth Circuit denied tribal power
to resolve a case filed by a reservation resident, widow of a tribal member, and
mother of tribal members against a non-Indian tribal employee for personal
injuries sustained within the territorial borders of the reservation."4 In the same
vein, the Ninth Circuit held in Pease that the tribal court had no jurisdiction to
hear a tribal member's challenge to a county tax on land he owned in fee within
the borders of the reservation. 4'
When considered against the backdrop of these post-exhaustion cases, then, the
Supreme Court's strongly worded praise of the tribal court system has a hollow
ring. Surely, tribal sovereignty is neither enhanced nor respected when courts
routinely refer to tribal court cases in which they will predictably hold that the
tribal court was powerless to adjudicate. 42 By interpreting Supreme Court
138. 964 F.2d 912, 920 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc), aff'g in part and vacating in part, 737 F. Supp. 601 (D.
Or. 1990).
139. See id at 914.
140. See A-] Contractors, 76 F.3d 930.
141. See Pease, 96 F.3d 1169.
142. Equally troubling is the clear willingness of the federal courts to review tribal court judgments on the
merits. Although the Supreme Court itself suggested the possibility when it noted in National Fanners that "the
orderly administration of justice in the federal court will be served by allowing a full record to be developed
in the Tribal Court before either the merits or any question concerning appropriate relief is addressed[,]"
National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985) (emphasis added), the
Court seemed to retreat from this expansive statement in Iowa Mutual when it stressed that "[ulnless a federal
court determines that the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction, proper deference to the tribal court system precludes
relitigation of issues... resolved in the Tribal Courts[,]" Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 19 (1987).
At least one federal judge is troubled by the jurisdictional hurdles presented by any review of tribal court
decisions. In a concurring opinion, Judge Loken noted that the jurisdictional basis for post-exhaustion review
is by no means clear. See Duncan Energy Co.. 27 F.3d at 1301-03 (Loken, J., concurring). Indeed, no federal
statute currently authorizes federal district court jurisdiction to review tribal court opinions. Nevertheless, postexhaustion review of a tribal court decision by the federal courts has been sustained by two federal courts of
appeal. Both the Tenth and the Ninth Circuits have held that the reviewing federal court apply a "clear error"
standard for a tribal court's findings of fact and a de novo review of a tribal court's conclusions of law. See
Mustang Prod. Co. v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382, 1384 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1288 (1997); FMC
v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311, 1313 (9th Cir. 1990).
Although these opinions specifically limit federal court review to questions of tribal court "jurisdiction," this
review can be extremely wide-ranging. Consider for example, the Ninth Circuit's application of the standard
in its disagreement with the Navajo Supreme Court about the meaning of provisions in a lease entered into
between the Navajo Nation and an electric utility. In Arizona Public Service Co. v. Aspaas, 77 F.3d 1128, 1130,
1134-35 (9th Cir. 1995), the court reached the merits of the underlying dispute, disagreed with the Navajo
Supreme Court's interpretation, and "reversed" the tribal court. The federal court failed, however, to establish
the source of its own jurisdiction to review and reverse tribal court opinions on the merits. See also ShoshoneBannock Tribes, 905 F.2d at 1313, in which the court noted that the district court had "reversed" the tribal
appellate court. One federal judge has noted that the procedural basis for this course of action is by no means
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precedent as requiring the lower courts to limit tribal adjudicatory powers to the
narrow domain of tribal legislative powers as allowed under Montana and its
progeny, the exhaustion doctrine is frequently reduced to a meaningless exercise.
In a pre-exhaustion challenge, the federal court will abstain to allow tribal court
no
adjudication, only to inform the tribal court on post-exhaustion review that it had
43
power to do what the earlier exhaustion decision had in fact required it to do.
IV. OVERCOMING OTHER OBSTACLES TO PLENARY
TRIBAL ADJUDICATORY JURISDICTION
Although the Supreme Court's failure to explicitly distinguish tribal
adjudicatory from tribal legislative jurisdiction is one of the primary explanations
of the limited tribal judicial powers recognized by non-tribal courts, other causes
can be identified as well. In its decisions, the Supreme Court has ordered state
and federal courts to pay "proper respect"' to tribal courts and has stressed
that "the alleged incompetence of tribal courts is not among the exceptions to the
exhaustion requirement ... ,,14' Language in some lower federal court cases
indicates a similar judicial willingness to "presume the tribal court to be
.

.

. competent and impartial."'

46

Nevertheless, the reality is often far from this

official standard.
Non-Tribal Evaluations of Tribal Courts
For some state and federal courts, the tribal system provides Indians an
unjustifiable "shield" from non-tribal legal obligations. Indian litigants in state
and federal courts who object to non-tribal adjudication on the basis of well
established Supreme Court doctrine 147 may be criticized as seeking to use their
"special status as an Indian as a shield to protect [them] from [off-reservation]
However, for whatever reason, non-tribal courts have not
obligations .

A.

*...,,148

obvious. In Duncan Energy Co., Judge Loken stressed that no federal statute currently authorizes federal court
review of tribal court opinions. See 27 F.3d at 1301-03 (Loken, J., concurring).
143. It is true that many cases referred to tribal court under the exhaustion doctrine have not returned to the
federal system for post-exhaustion review, thus demonstrating that, in some ways at least, "the rule is working
remarkably well." Douglas B.L. Endreson, The ChallengesFacingTribal Courts Today, 79 JUDICATURE 142, 144
(1995). As evidence of that assertion, Endreson pointed out that of the 50 reported cases in which the federal court
had ordered exhaustion, only one, Shoshone-BannockTribes, 905 F.2d 1311, had returned to the federal court after
exhaustion. See Endreson, supra,at 144-45. Since that article, at least two more cases, Mustang Production,94 F.3d
at 1384, and Aspaas, 77 F.3d 1128, have come back to federal court for post-exhaustion review. It is precisely these
"big" cases that are likely to become flashpoints for tribal sovereignty, and federal court review of those decisions
have an undeniably negative, restricting impact on tribal sovereignty, even though many of the exhaustion cases
are finally resolved by the tribal courts to which they were originally referred.
144. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 18 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978)).
145. I at 19.
146. Duncan Energy Co., 27 F.3d at 1301.
147. In Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), the Supreme Court held that state adjudication of a lawsuit
filed by a non-Indian doing business on the reservation against an alleged Indian debtor would impermissibly
interfere with tribal sovereign rights. See id at 223. The Williams Court confirmed a sphere of exclusive tribal
court adjudicatory jurisdiction. See id; see generally Reynolds, supra note 38, at 1095-97, 1136-37.
148. Natewa v. Natewa, 84 N.M. 69,71,499 P.2d 691,693 (1972); see Lonewolfv. Lonewolf, 99 N.M. 300,
302, 657 P.2d 627, 629 (1982); State Securities, Inc. v. Anderson, 84 N.M. 625, 628, 506 P.2d 786, 789 (1973)
(complaining that exclusive tribal jurisdiction over a cause of action "may result in shielding Indians from
obligations incurred off the reservation").
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been evenhanded in their criticism. Although numerous non-Indian litigants have
challenged state or federal court adjudications involving Indians or arising on the
reservation by raising Supreme Court precedent, not one of those non-Indians was
accused of trying to improperly "shield" himself from applicable law. 4 9
Non-tribal judicial resistance to plenary tribal adjudicatory powers extends,
however, beyond the generalized sense that Indian litigants have received
unwarranted protection from non-tribal adjudications. In some cases, the distrust
is directed at the tribal judicial system itself. One state judge, concurring in State
ex rel. Peterson v. District Court,'50 reluctantly agreed to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction a lawsuit that, under Supreme Court precedent,
belonged in tribal court.151 Carefully stressing that his comments were not
intended as criticism of the tribes or of their judges, Justice Raper reviewed the
"intolerable features"' 152 of the tribal court system. Along the same lines, but
in much harsher tones, a federal district court enjoined enforcement of a tribal
1 53
court order, disparaging the tribal proceedings as a "kangaroo court.'9
Presumably the Supreme Court's insistence that tribal adjudicatory power cannot
be defeated by allegations of tribal court incompetence has put those broadly
articulated allegations to rest. It has not, however, prevented some lower courts
from restricting tribal court jurisdictional powers on the basis of supposed
evidence of tribal court bias.
In Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Hatch," for example, a federal district court
refused to grant much deference to the holding of the Cheyenne-Arapaho Supreme
Court that non-Indian lessees were subject to a tribal severance tax on oil and gas.
In the district court's view, the fact that the tribe stood to lose or gain substantial
revenue in the lawsuit impugned the impartiality of the tribal court system. For
the federal court, the tribal court's position as a branch of the tribal government
gave it an impermissible "vested interest"'55 in the outcome of the case.
Similarly, another federal court refused to order exhaustion of tribal remedies
in a case filed by a non-Indian employee against the non-Indian company that
managed a casino owned by the tribe and located on tribal lands.156 Because

149. See, e.g., Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138 (1984);
Smith Plumbing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 720 P.2d 499 (Ariz. 1986); Kuykendall v. Tim's Buick, Pontiac,
GMC & Toyota, Inc., 719 P.2d 1081 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Neadeau v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 1993
WL 302127 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Foster v. Luce, 115 N.M. 331, 850 P.2d 1034 (Ct. App. 1993); Alexander
v. Cook, 90 N.M. 598, 566 P.2d 846 (Ct. App. 1977).
150. 617 P.2d 1056 (Wyo. 1980).
151. See id at 1070 (Raper, J., specially concurring).
152. IdL The justice's criticisms were directed at numerous features of the tribal court system. The
"intolerable features of the [tribal court] system" included: judges need not be legally trained; no court reporter
is required in tribal court; tribal judges may request interpretation of tribal law from the tribal executive branch;
unwritten tribal custom, which may constitute the basis of a tribal court decision, is not compiled in writing; and
the scope of tribal court judgments appears to be unlimited. See id at 1070-71.
153. Little Horn State Bank v. Crow Tribal Court, 690 F. Supp. 919, 923 (D. Mont. 1988), vacated by 708
F. Supp. 1561 (1989).
154. 890 F. Supp. 995, 1000 (W.D. Okla. 1995), affid, Mustang Prod. Co. v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382 (10th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1288 (1997).
155. Id It isimportant to note that no evidence in Mustang Fuel suggests, for example, that the tribal council
and the tribal court are one and the same, as they may be in some tribal systems. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 66 n.22 (1978).
156. See Vance v. Boyd Mississippi, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 905. 913 (D. Miss. 1995).
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the non-Indian defendant company had a contractual relationship with the tribe,
the court reasoned that tribal adjudication of the lawsuit would create the
appearance of judicial bias.'57 This court, like the court in Mustang Fuel, drew
the somewhat astonishing inference that a tribal court cannot be impartial in a
case involving a tribal governmental entity or a party with a contractual
relationship with a tribal governmental entity. Unfortunately, both courts
neglected to explain why that same appearance of partiality does not extend to the
numerous state or federal court cases in which a non-tribal government entity has
a similar relationship to one of the parties, or a similar "vested interest" in the
outcome of the case.
Eliminating bias and antagonism toward tribal courts, of course, cannot be
accomplished by judicial decree or legislative enactment. Cooperative efforts on
both the state-tribal5 s and federal-tribal 59 levels are important components
in the process. Congress also must adhere to its part of the bargain. Legislative
declarations of praise of tribal courts t fall far short of actually living up to
stated commitments to provide funds"' to enable tribal courts to meet the needs
of their constituents. In addition, the United States Supreme Court can assume
a leadership role in this process by ensuring that its actual holdings conform to

157. See id at 913. The court seems to have used the word "impartiality" when it meant "partiality":
"Because of the relationship between the Defendant... and the Tribe, the Court finds that there is a reasonable
question of the appearance of the impartiality of the Tribal Court." Id. Presumably, the federal district court
applauds tribal court impartiality.
158. See, e.g., Stanley G. Feldman and David L. Withey, Resolving State-Tribal Jurisdictional Dilemmas,
79 JUDICATURE 154 (1995); P.S. Deloria & Robert Laurence, Negotiating Tribal-State Full Faith and Credit
Agreements: The Topology of the Negotiation and the Merits of the Question, 28 GA. L. REV. 365 (1994);
Robert Laurence, The Enforcement of Judgments Across Indian Reservation Boundaries: Full Faith and Credit,
Comity, and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 OR. L. REV. 589 (1990). This Article is not unmindful of the
criticism that state-tribal relations are better served by those who actually negotiate agreements than by those
who write about the need for them. See Vine Deloria, Jr., Laws Founded in Justice and Humanity: Reflections
on the Content and Character of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 203, 218 (1989), quoted in Laurence,
supra, at 675 n.391. In partial response to that well-founded criticism, though, it does seem that the shape of
those state-tribal agreements will depend on whether the Supreme Court adopts a restrictive or expansive view
of tribal court adjudicatory jurisdiction.
159. See, e.g., J. Clifford Wallace, A New Era of Federal-Tribal Court Cooperation, 79 JUDICATURE 150
(1995).
160. The Indian Tribal Justice Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994), contains many unequivocal declarations
of support and respect of tribal judicial institutions, coupled with a statement of intent to provide needed funding
for the development of those institutions. In the preliminary section of findings, for instance, the Indian Tribal
Justice Act recites many pro-tribal sovereignty statements:
(3) Congress ...has recognized the self-determination, self-reliance, and inherent sovereignty
of Indian tribes;
(4) Indian tribes possess the inherent authority to establish their own form of government,
including tribal justice systems;
(5) tribal justice systems are an essential part of tribal governments...
(6) Congress and the Federal courts have repeatedly recognized tribal justice systems as the
appropriate forums for the adjudication of disputes affecting personal and property rights ....
Id. § 3601.
Nevertheless, Congress's failure to appropriate any of the money required to implement the Indian Tribal
Justice Act's substantive provisions, see Myers & Coochise, supra note 2, at 148-49. casts serious doubt on that
expressed legislative intent.
161. Currently, Congress appropriates approximately $12 million a year for a total of about 232 tribal judicial
systems. See S.REP. No. 102-314, at 15 (1992). That averages out to less than "$48,000 per court system, per
year to fund judges, clerks, prosecutors, defenders, the juvenile and probation departments, bailiffs and process
servers, court facilities, court resources, and administrative costs." Myers & Coochise, supra note 2, at 149.
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its pro-tribal court rhetoric. Explicitly distinguishing tribal adjudicatory authority
from legislative jurisdiction would be an important first step.
B.

The Unreviewability of Tribal Court Decisions
The Supreme Court's century-old holdings in Ex parte Crow Dog 6 2 and
Talton v. Mayes'63 announced the now well established Indian law principle that
tribal governments, in contrast to their state and federal counterparts, are not
limited by federal constitutional restrictions. Because tribal governments existed
long before adoption of the United States Constitution, the Court reasoned in
those early cases, their sovereignty is neither dependent upon constitutional
enumerations of power nor subject to constitutional limitations.'6 Adding to
the insularity of tribal courts, no statutory language provides for federal review
of tribal court decisions." As a result, tribal court holdings would seem to be
unreviewable by non-tribal courts." This "unreviewability," however, is more
theoretical than real; in practice, both the state and federal courts exercise
considerable reviewing power over tribal court judgments.
At the state court level, states have wide latitude in their responses to a tribal
court judgment. Although the Supreme Court has obliquely suggested 67 and
commentators have arguedsa to the contrary, tribal court judgments typically
do not receive full faith and credit recognition from state courts. 169 Execution

162. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
163. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
164. See Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 568, 572. The principle has remained unchallenged; other courts have found
different specific constitutional provisions inapplicable to tribal governments. See, e.g., Twin Cities Chippewa
Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1967) (due process clause not applicable
to tribe); Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959) (free exercise clause
cannot be raised against tribal government). The Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1994),
imposes on tribal governments guarantees of individual liberties similar to the federal Bill of Rights. That statute,
however, can be enforced only in tribal court. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
165. See Laurence, supra note 158, at 659; see also Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort
Berthold Reservation, 27 F.3d 1294, 1301-03 (8th Cir. 1994) (Loken, J., concurring).
166. The one clear exception is contained in the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1994), which
allows a federal court to issue a writ of habeas corpus to test the legality of a tribe's order to detain an
individual. The Indian Civil Rights Act's habeas provision has been applied beyond "conventional notions of
physical custody" to include challenges to tribal actions that impose "severe restraints on individual liberty."
Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 894 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Hensley v. Municipal
Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973)). In Poodry, the Second Circuit admitted under the Indian Civil Rights Act's
habeas provision a challenge to a tribal banishment order. See id at 895. The court noted that banishment is
a fate "universally decried by civilized people." Id at 896 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). The
court's willingness to construe the habeas provision broadly appears linked to its observation that no other
remedy was available to the petitioners under either tribal or federal law. See id. at 885.
167. In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), the Court noted: "Judgments of tribal courts,
as to matters properly within their jurisdiction, have been regarded in some circumstances as entitled to full faith
and credit in other courts." Id. at 66 n.21.
168. See Clinton, supra note 38, at 150; Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26
WILLAMETrE L. REV. 841 (1990); Daina B. Garonzik, Comment, Full Reciprocity for Tribal Courts from a
Federal Courts Perspective: A Proposed Aiendinent to the Full Faith and Credit Act, 45 EMORY L.J. 723
(1996).
169. The full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution, article IV, section 1, applies only to
states. Professor Robert Clinton has argued, however, that the federal full faith and credit statute includes tribal
judgments. That statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994), provides that the "records and judicial proceedings of any
court of any such State, Territory, or Possession ...shall have the same full faith and credit in every court
within the United States ...."Id See generally Clinton, supra note 168. Professor Robert Laurence disagrees.
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of a tribal judgment off the reservation, then, may result in substantial state court
scrutiny of the legal issues resolved in tribal court. 7 ° In essence, a state court's
refusal to enforce tribal judgments voids a tribal court's holding. In some states,
In
legislation establishes prerequisites for recognition of tribal judgments.'
others, courts apply generalized notions of comity to recognize certain tribal
judgments.1 72 Notwithstanding these possible avenues for off-reservation
enforcement of tribal judgments, serious obstacles remain.
In Red Fox v. Hettich,17 3 for example, the South Dakota Supreme Court
refused to enforce a tribal judgment against a non-Indian defendant, ruling that
because the tribe lacked legislative jurisdiction over the state highway passing
through its reservation, it was similarly divested of jurisdiction to adjudicate the
controversy. 74 Refusal to distinguish between types of Indian jurisdiction, then,
has placed at least one state court in line with the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, and
with their insistence that Montana's narrow definition of tribal power over nonIndians applies to determine the scope of tribal court adjudicatory power as
well. 75 This narrow view of tribal adjudicatory power, when coupled with the
ability of a state court to engage in wide-ranging review of tribal court judgments
before enforcing them, makes tribal judgments vulnerable and uncertain in offreservation enforcement situations.
The Supreme Court's sweeping definition of federal question jurisdiction in
National Farmers,176 to include all disputes over tribal "jurisdiction," has given
federal courts extremely broad reviewing power over tribal court judgments. In
See generally Laurence, supra note 158. For a discussion of the different views regarding full faith and credit
between state and tribal court systems, see Recognizing and Enforcing State and Tribal Judgments: A
Roundtable Discussion of Law, Policy, and Practice, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 47 (1993) (roundtable discussion
among Hon. Richard E. Ransom, Hon. Christine Zuni, P.S. Deloria, Robert N. Clinton, Robert Laurence, Nell
Jessup Newton, and M.E. Occhialino, Jr.).
170. In stark contrast, under well established doctrine, the full faith and credit clause and statute prohibit
relitigation of all issues, including jurisdictional ones, that have been "fully and fairly litigated and finally
decided in the court which rendered the original judgment." Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111 (1963). As
a result, state court jurisdictional findings, though they may be clearly erroneous, are binding on the second court
asked to enforce the judgment on which those erroneous jurisdictional findings rest. See Robert N. Clinton,
Comments on Dispute Resolution in Indian Country: Does Abstention Make the Heart Grow Fonder?, 71 N.D.
L. REV. 541, 554-56 (1995). But see Britton v. Gannon, 285 P.2d 407, 409 (Okla. 1955).
171. See, e.g., Barrett v. Barrett, 878 P.2d 1051, 1054 (Okla. 1994) (describing OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 728 (West Cum. Supp. 1997), which authorizes Oklahoma's state supreme court to establish standards for
recognition of tribal court judgments); One Feather v. O.S.T. Public Safety Comm'n, 482 N.W.2d 48, 50 (S.D.
1992) (applying state comity statute, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 1-1-25, 1-1-25(1), l-1-25(2)(a-d) (Michie Supp.
1996), to tribal judgment); see also Karla Engle, Comment, Red Fox v. Hettich: Does South Dakota's Comity
Statute Foster Unwarranted State Court Intrusion hito Tribal Jurisdictional Authority Over Civil Disputes?, 38
S.D. L. REV. 706 (1993); Darby L. Hoggatt, Comment, The Wyoming Tribal Full Faith and Credit Act:
Enforcing Tribal Judgments and Protecting Tribal Sovereignty, 30 LAND & WATER L. REV. 531 (1995).
172. See, e.g., Fredericks v. Eide-Kirschmann Ford, 462 N.W.2d 164 (N.D. 1990); Brown v. Babbitt Ford,
571 P.2d 689 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977). New Mexico's Supreme Court has held that Navajo tribal laws are entitled
to full faith and credit in New Mexico courts not out of comity. but because the Navajo Nation is a "territory"
within the meaning of the federal full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994). See Jim v. CIT Fin.
Servs. Corp., 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975).
173. 494 N.W.2d 638 (S.D. 1993).
174. See id. at 646-47.
175. See supra Part II.C.I.
176. 471 U.S. 845, 850-52 (1985). Pursuant to federal statute, the federal district courts have "original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1994).
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fact, under the Court's description of post-exhaustion review by the federal courts,
it is hard to imagine any tribal judgment that does not present a federal question.
Moreover, as interpreted by at least one federal court, the review extends beyond
jurisdictional questions to encompass review of the merits of a tribal court
decision. Consider the Ninth Circuit's disagreement with the Navajo Supreme
Court about the meaning of provisions in a lease entered into between the Navajo
Nation and an electric utility that operated on tribal lands. In Arizona Public
Service Co. v. Aspaas, the Navajo Supreme Court held that a non-Indian electric
utility company operating on the reservation violated applicable tribal employment
discrimination laws."' The non-Indian company challenged that tribal decision
in federal court, alleging that the tribal court had no jurisdiction over the
lawsuit. 78 Although the federal court was willing to assume for the sake of
argument that the Navajo Nation retained the inherent sovereign power "to
regulate employment relations of a non-Indian employer and Indian
employees,' ' 79 the court nevertheless held that the ordinance was unenforceable.t' In the court's view, the Navajo Nation had waived, in "sufficiently
clear contractual terms," its sovereign power to enforce that law.' 8 1 Thus,
although the court purported to be deciding a jurisdictional issue, the federal
decision clearly invalidated, on the merits, the Navajo Supreme Court's holding
that the Navajo Nation had not waived its sovereign power in the lease.
In the final analysis, the oft-noted Indian law principle that tribal court opinions
are unreviewable may be seriously eroded by what is actually fairly extensive
"back door" review and control by state and federal courts. Nevertheless, it is
this same principle of unreviewability that seems to be a major stumbling block
to full implementation of tribal adjudicatory powers. After all, tribal courts stand
alone as a judicial system insulated from Supreme Court oversight. 8 2 Although
this insulation may be doctrinally sound because of the tribal governments' preconstitutional status, some sort of carefully tailored extra-tribal appellate review
may actually enhance rather than decrease the scope of tribal adjudication.
Prominent Indian law scholars have recognized that extra-tribal review is likely
and not altogether undesirable. 8 3 At the same time, though, other scholars note
the inescapable irony that "[t]he more important tribal courts become, particularly
in their authority over non-Indians, the more need there seems to be for increasing
federal scrutiny."'4 Although this Article does not explore the implications of
any particular system, such as a special Indian Court of Appeals," 5 Supreme

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See 77 F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing the Navajo Supreme Court decision).
See id
Id. at 1134.
See id at 1135.
See id
See Clinton, supra note 168, at 849.

183. See, e.g., id.; Robert Laurence, A Memorandum to the Class, in Which the Teacher is Finally Pinned

Down and Forced to Divulge His Thoughts on What Indian Law Should Be, 46 ARK. L. REV. 1. 5-15 (1993).
184. POMMERsHEtM, supra note 17, at 95. In a similar vein, Professor Judith Resnik has noted that "when

non-Indians are involved ... federal court interest in 'tribal sovereignty' wanes." Judith Resnik, Dependent
Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 755 (1989).

185. Several authors have suggested the creation of a specialized Indian Court of Appeals. See Michael C.
Blumm & Michael Cadigan, The Indian Court of Appeals: A Modest Proposal to Eliminate Supreme Court
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Court review by way of writ of certiorari,1'6 or jurisdiction over tribal decisions
in lower federal courts,'87 it does recognize that the absence of this review may
in fact be a major obstacle to plenary tribal court adjudicatory power.
V. CONCLUSION
Although non-tribal resistance to broad tribal court jurisdiction undoubtedly has
many roots, the Supreme Court's failure to explicitly distinguish tribal
adjudicatory jurisdiction from regulatory jurisdiction has been an important
contributing factor. The Court's commitment to expansive tribal court power has
been engulfed by its own strong endorsement of an increasingly more restrictive
view of tribal legislative power. As a result, the lower federal courts, reading the
tea leaves of Supreme Court precedent, have interpreted the Court's decisions as
limiting tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction to the narrow scope of tribal legislative
jurisdiction determined in cases such as Montana, Brendale, and Bourland.
Supreme Court clarification of the distinction, which is in fact implicit in its
holdings and in its analysis, would be a major step toward a fair and respectful
accommodation of tribal sovereign interests, ensuring that tribal courts will be
able to adjudicate the rights and interests of the individuals who live and conduct
business on the reservation or whose actions have an impact on important tribal
sovereign interests. Continuation of the current narrow conception of tribal
judicial power, in contrast, ignores the actual facts of the Court's important
holding in National Farmers, ignores the Court's repeated declarations of
commitment to wide-ranging tribal court adjudications, and ignores the fact that
tribal courts have been singled out to endure remarkably narrow limits on what
is, after 'ls
all,
"among the most basic and indispensable manifestations of sovereign
s
power.'
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(discussing a federal Indian Court of Appeals).
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